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Book Review

A Failed Coup on the Judicial Monarchy
God and Man in the Law: The Foundations of AngloAmerican Constitutionalism
by Robert Lowry Clinton
University Press of Kansas (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
“The Imperial Judiciary lives.”1 Echoing Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, Robert Clinton’s God and Man in the Law decries the
evils of a constitutional jurisprudence which has “effectively
enthrone[d] the judiciary as a kind of constitutional monarchy.”2 God and Man in the Law attempts to debunk the legal,
historical, philosophical, epistemological, and anti-theistic
foundations upon which this “judicialized” constitutionalism
rests. In its place, Clinton proposes a revival of a constitutional
jurisprudence that presupposes a transcendent source of legal
order in the world and is based upon the traditions of the common law. Clinton’s vision of a naturalistic jurisprudence ultimately fails, however, for theoretical and practical reasons.
Clinton contends that the heart of modern constitutional
woes lies in the prevailing judicial supremacy on constitutional
matters. He posits that judicial supremacy results from the
Court’s simultaneous possession of two powers: (1) judicial finality (“the power to decide all—or nearly all—constitutional
cases, including those that determine the constitutional
authority of other agencies of government”)3 and (2) judicial
freedom (“the power to select the interpretive rules according to
1. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 22 (1997).
3. Id. at 54.
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which [constitutional] cases will be decided”).4 Clinton asserts
that “the modern fusion of judicial finality with judicial freedom in constitutional law . . . has no basis in traditional legal
practice,”5 “destroys judicial accountability,”6 and results in judicial “tyranny.”7 Accordingly, the antidote to judicial supremacy is to limit the Court’s power by depriving the Court of either judicial finality or judicial freedom.8 The former
alternative was the thesis of Clinton’s earlier work;9 the latter
solution is the thesis of God and Man in the Law.
Clinton articulates his argument for limiting the Court’s
power to choose its interpretive tools as an effort to bind judges
to “traditional interpretive rules in the decision of all constitutional cases.”10 Such a traditional jurisprudence, argues Clinton, is not a radical proposal intended to appeal only to religious fundamentalists;11 rather, its appeal extends to “all who
wish to see the Constitution and its law standing upon the surest possible foundation.”12 In developing this goal, Clinton
crisscrosses the academic landscape, drawing heavily on scholarly thought in a variety of disciplines, including judicial politics, history, political philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics,
and political theology.13
4. Id.
5. Id. at 28.
6. Id.
7. Id. Clinton provides a cogent illustration of the potentially dictatorial nature
of judicial supremacy as follows: “When the Court fails to achieve consensus, it risks
falling into something approaching . . . dictatorship. For example, whenever there is a
5-to-4 split on an important constitutional ruling, one justice effectively determines the
social choice for all society, regardless of anyone else’s preferences.” Id. at 54. When
viewed in this light, the modern judiciary is far from the innocuous judiciary described
by Hamilton in Federalist No. 78. See id. at 28.
8. See id. at 40 (“[T]he best way to ensure judicial accountability in a constitutional system governed by a nonelective judiciary is by tying judicial interpretation of
the Constitution very closely to traditional modes of legal analysis. Alternatively, if
traditional modes of analysis are rejected, then fidelity to our constitutional system
requires rejection of an ultimate judicial guardianship of the Constitution.”).
9. See id. at 54 (referring the reader to ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1.
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. See id. at xi. In attempting this challenging “merger” of academic fields, it is
clear that Clinton has been no stranger to Alexander Pope’s Pierian spring. As a concomitant warning, however, Clinton’s book presupposes the reader’s familiarity with a
host of ancient and modern political thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Austin, Aquinas,
Hegel, Hobbes, Kant, J.S. Mill, Locke, Arrow, Harris, Adler, Gilson, and many others.
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The discussion below tracks the development of Clinton’s
defense of traditional jurisprudence, providing both a summary
of Clinton’s major points and a critical response to his analysis.
Part II.A discusses Clinton’s premise that the emergence of judicial hegemony in modern constitutional jurisprudence is a result of the fundamental misconception as to what a written
constitution is. Part II.B considers the foundations of traditional jurisprudence in the social consensus of the common law
and its societal antecedents. Part II.C attempts to capture the
politico-philosophical underpinnings of Clinton’s traditional jurisprudence, and Part II.D includes some thoughts on Clinton’s
effort to place his theory within the framework of a worldview
that presupposes the existence of a God who imparts to man a
legal order with transcendent structure. This Review concludes
that while Clinton’s articulation of the problem of judicial supremacy on constitutional matters is accurate, his proposed
remedy is inapplicable as a practical matter and is couched in a
metaphysical framework that escapes serious critique due to
its cryptic nature.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Problematic Conceptions of the Constitution
1. Summary
Clinton asserts that judicial hegemony in the constitutional
arena stems from a fundamental misconception of the Constitution as merely a written “blueprint of the good society”14—“a
written set of general guidelines,”15 which are to be translated
into reality “under the special guardianship of particular
‘rights-sensitive’ institutions, the courts.”16 The justification for
such an approach seems to lie in the assumption that constitutional rules were “created,” ex nihilo,17 by a “group of sociopoliThis background requirement, combined with Clinton’s sometimes recondite style of
writing, pushes the book to the edge of incomprehensibility for the lay reader and, in
all likelihood, will send even those well-schooled in these areas to their libraries on occasion.
14. Id. at 18 (quoting Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 394 (1985)).
15. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 19.
16. Id. at 74.
17. See id. at 59 (meaning, literally, “from nothing”).
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tical elites,”18 interested in “perpetuat[ing] [their] long-term political and/or economic interests at the expense of other
groups.”19
Clinton argues that the “blueprint” metaphor presents a
number of problems for constitutional jurisprudence. First,
blueprint constitutionalism “reduces the Constitution to a
plethora of empty words and phrases with ever-changing content . . . upon which courts or other deconstructive interpreters
are expected to graft substantive rules and principles in order
to keep an essentially meaningless text ‘in tune with the
times.’ ”20 Such an approach “overemphasizes the prescriptive,
future-oriented malleability of a constitution”21 and places constitutional law essentially on the same level as any other law,
thus suggesting that constitutional law “may be abrogated just
as easily as any other law . . . when its provisions are found inconvenient.”22 Furthermore, the instability of the Constitution
under the blueprint model reinforces society’s “ ‘dependen[cy]’
on the omnipresent, omnicompetent federal judge”23 to reveal
the Constitution’s true meaning. This, in turn, has led to the
recent increase in various forms of “textualism.”24
In contrast to the blueprint definition of the Constitution,
Clinton asserts that a written “constitution” is more appropriately conceived of as an attempt to capture “a set of fundamental precepts so widely shared as to ‘constitute’ the society over
large stretches of time.”25 Clinton’s emphasis is on a wide,
multi-generational consensus of political opinion in society—
i.e., tradition.26 A constitution, viewed from this perspective,
not only imbues constitutional language with a “given”27 substantive content that logically should constrain judges engaged
in constitutional interpretation, but also validates treating the
Constitution as a basic governing law that binds successive
generations
and
that
justifies
more
vigilant

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 18.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 20.
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protection than less general forms of law.28
Despite the differences between the blueprint model and
Clinton’s definition of constitution, however, Clinton concedes
that the Constitution is not complete in and of itself. In fact,
Clinton asserts that “it is . . . impossible for a single writing . . .
to capture fully the whole of society’s constitutional principles.
At best, the provisions of a written constitution can provide an
incomplete list of such principles and thus can be just a more or
less adequate reflection of that society’s real constitution.”29
This “real” constitution is the “underlying decisional predispositions of [the] polity’s citizenry,”30 which are “so widely
acknowledged and accepted as to form a significant part of society’s self-definition.”31 Thus, the written Constitution is only
the “real” Constitution to the extent that the constitutional
symbols represented by the text correspond to the underlying
constitutional experiences that they represent.32 Viewing the
Constitution in this way rejects a purely “textualist” approach
to constitutional issues and requires constitutional interpreters
to consider these underlying constitutional experiences.
2. Critical response
Clinton’s discussion of “blueprint” constitutionalism admittedly has strong appeal. Upon closer scrutiny, however, Clinton’s polarization of blueprint adherents from traditional adherents seems an overstatement at best.
First, it is doubtful that even the most liberal constitutional
theorists view the Constitution as “a plethora of empty words
and phrases,”33 completely void of substantive content. On the
contrary, even the ardent textualists not only admit, but even
positively assert that legal texts have a “given” content, though
they argue that the “given” meaning is inherent in the text itself rather than (as Clinton suggests) in the historical circumstances under which the text was produced.34

28. See id. at 41.
29. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id. at 62.
32. See id. at 64.
33. Id. at 18.
34. Ironically, the goal of the textualists is the same as Clinton’s: to impose judicial restraint in the interpretation of legal texts. See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS
OF LAW 259 (1994) (“Textualism’s central claimed virtue is [that] . . . it prevents fur-
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Second, even Clinton’s own view of the written Constitution
as an attempt to embody society’s unwritten constitution recognizes that substantive content must be imposed on the text.
Indeed, Clinton’s constitutional conception is subject to the
same criticism he heaps upon blueprint constitutionalism—i.e.,
Clinton all but explicitly endorses the view that, without the
substantive “help” of the common law, the Constitution is indeed only a “plethora of empty words and phrases.”
Finally, the stated objective of the Constitution—“in Order
to form a more perfect Union”35—implies that the goals of the
Constitution were, at least to some degree, future-oriented—
i.e., “blueprints” for improving upon the existing constitution of
society by codifying in a written constitution principles which,
at least in some respects, were previously nonexistent.36 This
point is illustrated by Clinton’s own example. While he enumerates a number of principles embodied in the Constitution
which do in fact have historical antecedents in the common
law,37 Clinton seems, by negative implication, to admit that
other constitutional provisions were without common law
antecedents. For instance, conspicuously absent from Clinton’s enumerated list are the ideas of due process and equal
protection.
Therefore, to carry the blueprint analogy a step further, the
question is not whether the Constitution is or is not a blueprint
of sorts, upon which good societal houses have been built, but
rather what is the proper source of the materials with which to
fill out the blueprint. For Clinton, the source is the common
law. This approach may indeed be valuable in cases where the
constitutional provisions at issue do in fact have clearly identifiable common law antecedents. But where the common law
basis for the clauses is less conspicuous (or nonexistent), Clinthering mere judicial intent. The textualist’s central fear is that judges will impose
their own views of sound policy under the guise of having discovered a subtly hidden
legislative intent in the legislative history or purpose.”).
35. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
36. Professor Laurence Tribe describes such future-oriented provisions in the
Constitution as “aspirational.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Comment by Laurence Tribe appearing in the same publication) 87-88 (1997) (stating that
while “some [constitutional] provisions refer quite pointedly to preserving past practices, . . . others are more plausibly read as statements of aspiration [which] the authors or ratifiers wished to make binding on their representatives into the indefinite
future even if extant practices would have to be substantially revised in order to
achieve that end”).
37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ton’s reliance on the common law may not provide adequate
substantive content for the blueprint.
B. The Foundations of Social Consensus in Traditional
Constitutional Jurisprudence
1. Summary
Regarding the Constitution’s British common law roots,
Clinton suggests that
of the twenty-one sections making up the first four articles of
the U.S. Constitution, at least sixteen contain one or more
provisions that are directly traceable to English sources.
Similarly, at least seventeen of twenty-eight provisions in the
first eight amendments of the U.S. Constitution find their ancestry in the common law of England.38

These principles, in turn, were the result of the constant refining process that took place as the common law developed
through the decision-making of judges in individual cases. Over
time, the principles of constitutional consensus emerged, while
the aberrations largely snuffed themselves out.
According to Clinton, the common law’s attempt to tie the
law to the underlying “constitutional” principles emerging from
the experience of people led to the formulation of various legal
conventions and rules of interpretation,39 which, when properly
applied, effectuated the social consensus, or “constitution” of
society.
A study of the development of the legal rules and conventions governing constitutional interpretation begins with an
analysis of the role of intent. Clinton discriminates among four
different kinds of intent. First, he distinguishes subjective intent (which asserts that “the proper way to understand the
meaning of a legal text is in terms of what the makers of that
text actually ‘had in mind’ ”)40 from objective intent (which focuses on the object of the makers’ intentions—i.e., not on what
the authors actually had in mind, but rather on “what they
must reasonably be presumed to have had in mind”).41 Clinton

38.
39.
40.
41.

CLINTON, supra note 2, at 97.
See id. at 104-05.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
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adopts the latter as the better approach in legal interpretation,
not only for the results it produces, but more fundamentally
because it was the prevailing view with regard to matters of intent in interpreting other legal documents at the time the Constitution was written.42
Closely tied to the subjective/objective intent distinction is
the correlative distinction between original intent (which assumes that the Constitution was created “ex nihilo (and thus a
priori) pursuant to ‘intentions’ that plausibly may be regarded
as ‘original’ ”)43 and remedial intent (which considers “the mischiefs meant to be addressed but left intact (or addressed unsuccessfully) under the old law that may be remedied either by
enlargement or restriction under a new interpretation”).44 Clinton adopts the remedial intent approach because, “[t]hough
what [the framers] had in mind is not, and never can be, fully
knowable, the mischiefs and remedies are.”45
Clinton recognizes that intentions, however viewed, are
based on preferences that are always subjective.46 Thus, in order for intentions to operate as real constraints, they must be
grounded in objective legal fictions which, by continuous application, become legal conventions.47 Clinton argues that traditional legal conventions developed from three traditional rules
of textual interpretation. The first of these is the plainmeaning or literal rule, which assumes that the best indication
of what the makers intended consists of what they wrote—i.e.,
the words themselves, “understood in their most usual and
most known signification.”48 The plain-meaning rule also contains a subjective and an objective component: the subjective
focus is on what the words meant to the makers of the law; the
objective focus is on the plain meaning associated with the law
from the perspective of the reasonable man to whom the law
applies.49
The second rule of interpretation, subordinate to the plain42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
See id. at 111.
See id.
Id. at 112 (quoting Blackstone, in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE
LAW 18 (1986)).
49. See id. at 113.
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meaning rule, is the “mischief” or “social purpose” rule.50 This
rule, which applies only when the plain-meaning rule is inadequate to resolve the issue, authorizes (for interpretive purposes) “reliance upon the ‘evils’ which the law was designed to
remedy.”51 The burden under the mischief rule is to show that
the departure suggested would have been agreed to by the
makers of the law if they had considered the issue in the given
context.52
The third and final rule of interpretation is the “golden”
rule.53 This rule is “a rule of consistency, which authorizes departure from the literal interpretation even when the language
is unambiguous, where . . . ‘the words bear either none, or a
very absurd signification, if literally understood.’ ”54 The absurdity involved must be “a matter of logic” (e.g., colliding provisions in the same statute), “not merely one of policy.”55
These traditional rules of interpretation undergird the use
of another important legal convention which is a product of the
common law: the principle of stare decisis or adherence to
precedent.56 Original intent, with a focus on the objective intent
aspect, requires consistency in the law. This need for consistency finds its satisfaction in the practice of stare decisis.
Proponents of modern constitutional theory view adherence
to precedent as “a reactionary device designed to retard social
progress by allowing the past to govern the present.”57 In response, Clinton asserts that adherence to precedent does not
shackle the present to the past; rather, it consists of “ ‘trusting
to a consensus of common human voices rather than to some
isolated or arbitrary record.’ ”58 Under this view, we are not
governed by the dead, but rather “have the dead at our councils.”59
Clinton concludes that these traditional conventions and
rules of legal interpretation form the basis of the common law

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 112.
Id.
See id. at 113.
See id. at 112.
Id. (quoting Blackstone, in WOLFE, supra note 48, at 19).
Id. at 112; see also id. at 114.
See id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 16 (quoting GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 84-86 (1908)).
Id. at 119.
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jurisprudence through which the constitutional principles of
societal consensus have emerged over the centuries. Thus, they
have proved, through experience, to be effective methods of obtaining reasoned results that comport with the basic notions of
justice as held by society as a whole. Clinton contends that
when the Supreme Court has relied on them in its own jurisprudential thought, its actions have generally been validated
over time. On the other hand, when the Court has deviated
from these principles in the past, the results have been disastrous60 and will likely be so again under the current constitutional jurisprudence.61
2. Critical response
The central problem with Clinton’s call for the implementation of traditional conventions of textual interpretation is that
even if the courts could be required to abide by such standards,
there is no evidence that they would remedy the judicial supremacy which Clinton so vehemently opposes. An analysis of
these rules and conventions bears this out.
a. The plain-meaning rule. First, as Clinton admits, the conventional rules of interpretation are susceptible to abuse.62 On
the subject of plain meaning, Justice Holmes once remarked
that “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used.”63
Indeed, one does not have to look very hard in a law student’s first-year contracts text to find cases on parol evidence in
which one judge argues vehemently that the “plain meaning” of
a particular legal text is thus and so, while her colleague, with
equal vigor, argues that the same language is unquestionably
ambiguous.64 Such contradictions call into question the validity
60. See id. at 31 (citing to cases such as Dredd Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner
v. New York, and stating that “most (if not all) such . . . ‘bad’ decisions were founded
upon departures from traditional interpretive rules”).
61. See id., at 32.
62. See id. at 115 (noting that misapplication of the three basic rules of interpretation has resulted in the “intrusion of the private moral convictions of judges upon our
constitutional law”); see also id. at 116 (noting that the rules of interpretation have
been, on occasion, “questionably applied”).
63. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
64. The California Supreme Court summarized the problems with the plainmeaning rule as follows:
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of wholesale acceptance of the plain-meaning rule and support
the view that “[a] sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already the product of one.”65 Moreover, it seems ironic
that Clinton would advocate the plain-meaning rule since its
application, by definition, precludes an analysis of the common
law underpinnings of supposedly “plain” constitutional text in
all cases except those in which the plain meaning leads to logically absurd results. It would seem that Clinton’s theory would
get more theoretical mileage from an attack on, rather than an
endorsement of, the plain-meaning rule. Indeed, the plainmeaning rule is the fundamental tenant of the textualist approaches which he opposes.
b. The mischief rule. Second, the mischief rule is subject to
similar criticism. While it can be admitted that existing historical records give some indication as to the evils which the
law was designed to remedy, the evidence of “remedial intent”
often seems no less insulated from subjective interpretation
than the subjective intent of those enacting the law.66 As with
the search for subjective intent, the central problem with the
mischief rule is that it fails to recognize that, like Congress, the
framers “[were] a they, not an it.”67 One commentator questioned the validity of the use of “purpose” in statutory interpretation as follows:
[I]s it any more meaningful to refer to “the” purpose than it is
to refer to “the” intent? Statutes are not the product of a single lawmaker but of a collegial body with a rather large membership. Might not individual legislators have different, even

“A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a
symbol of algebra or chemistry, . . . .” The meaning of particular words or
groups of words varies with the “. . . verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes . . . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors;
much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning.”
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45
(Cal. 1968) (citations omitted).
65. Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech
Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other
Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625, 637 (1978).
66. As for example, in the case where one legislator votes to enact a moment of
silence in the public schools in order to “remedy” the absence of God from the classroom, another legislator might vote to enact the moment of silence in order to “remedy”
a perceived lack of student focus on their studies at the beginning of each school day.
The fact that both legislators view the legislation as a remedy to an existing mischief
does not make their subjective intent any more objective.
67. HANKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 249.
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conflicting, purposes in mind? Suppose only a portion (a majority? a majority of the majority? a few dozens?) of the legislators had a particular purpose in mind—can that be “the”
purpose of the Act?68

Like statutes, the Constitution, as ultimately drafted, represented a number of compromises among the various “mischiefs” the individual framers intended to remedy. Thus, resort
to Clinton’s mischief rule seems to open rather than close
the door to the interpolation of judicial will in constitutional
interpretation.
c. The golden rule. Third, Clinton’s “golden” rule is inadequate as a rule of judicial constraint. The golden rule only operates as an exception to the plain-meaning rule when adherence to the plain meaning creates a “logical” absurdity.69 Thus,
judges are still constrained by the plain-meaning rule where its
application results “merely” in a policy-based absurdity. Using
Clinton’s own example, a logical absurdity exists when a statute contains conflicting provisions. The absurdity is logical
since it would be impossible for a judge to enforce one provision
without doing violence to the other provision. Certainly, the
appropriateness of rejecting the plain-meaning rule under such
circumstances is unassailable. What if, however, the absurdity
does not require a logical violation of the statute, as in the case
where the facts unmistakably fall within the plain meaning of
the statute, but clearly violate “the spirit” of the statute?
To draw upon a famous example, the court in the case of
Riggs v. Palmer70 addressed the question of whether a grandson who murdered his grandfather should be allowed to inherit
his estate under an intestate succession statute whose “plain
meaning” required such a result. Under Clinton’s golden rule,
the judge would be required to grant the son his inheritance,71
68. Id. at 352.
69. See supra, notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
70. 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
71. Indeed, some courts, adhering to Clinton’s golden rule, did in fact reach such
a conclusion. See, for example, the (in)famous case of Deem v. Milliken, in which a
murdering son was granted his mother’s inheritance. 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (1892), reprinted
in HANKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 249. In arriving at this conclusion, the Deem court
stated that “when the legislature . . . speaks in clear language upon a question of policy,
it becomes the judicial tribunals to remain silent. . . . Judicial tribunals of the state
have no concern with the policy of legislation.” Id. (emphasis added). Critical of such
views, Justice Cardozo once remarked that “[j]udges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform it, nonetheless, with averted gaze,
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since the absurd result was one of “mere” policy, rather than
logic.72 In other words, adherence to the plain meaning of the
descent statute would not result in a logical violation of the
statute; rather it was the policy underlying the statute which
would be violated by strict adherence to the statute’s plain
meaning.73 Despite Clinton’s golden rule, the Riggs court
looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute and, by applying “maxims . . . dictated by public policy,”74 reached the undeniably just result of denying the grandson his inheritance. The
justness of results achieved in the breach of the golden rule
discredits Clinton’s reliance on the distinctions between logic
and policy as indicators of when deviance from plain meaning
is appropriate.
d. The principle of stare decisis. Finally, as any student who
has read a legal casebook can tell you, the principle of stare decisis is highly malleable in the hands of a creative judge. In determining the precedential value of a case, the creative judge
may elude the constraints of stare decisis by finding (or creating) a basis upon which to distinguish the previous case from
the present one. This ability to confine prior cases to their facts
allows courts to wiggle out of tight spots by deciding that “[t]his
rule holds only for redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick
cars, [and thus has no application in the case at bar].”75 In
convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the bidding of their office. The victim
is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the alter of regularity.” BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924).
72. One might argue that an absurd result in Riggs might easily be avoided by
application of Clinton’s mischief rule. However, under Clinton’s taxonomy, the mischief
rule is only activated when the statute is ambiguous on its face. Thus, since the plain
meaning in this case was clear, the mischief rule has no direct application. Alternatively, a finding that the statute in Riggs was ambiguous could only be arrived at by
considering the underlying policy rationale for the statute. Allowing this would amount
to a total abrogation of the plain-meaning rule, since the mischief rule would, in effect,
be permitted to invoke itself by its own bootstraps.
73. That this was a question of policy rather than logic is supported by noting
that, as a matter of logic, it would be untrue to say that the law “never permits a man
to profit from wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from
their legal wrongs. The most notorious case is adverse possession—if I trespass on your
land long enough, some day I will gain a right to cross your land whenever I please.”
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967), reprinted in
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-80 (1978). Thus, the decision as to
whether one should benefit from her wrongs depends on a choice of policy rather than
one of pure logic.
74. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
75. KARL LLEWELYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-67 (3d
ed. 1960).
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other words, when referring to precedent, judges tend to take
full advantage of Clinton’s notion that the dead are only “counselors” rather than “rulers.”76 This ability of judges to manipulate past decisions by reading precedent broadly or narrowly
limits the value of stare decisis as a tool for imposing judicial
restraint.
Once it is admitted, based upon the observations above,
that the rules of interpretation (traditional or otherwise) and
the principle of stare decisis are subject to “corrupt” application,77 it becomes difficult to accept Clinton’s thesis that imposing traditional rules of constitutional interpretation on the
courts will significantly reduce the amount of judicial hegemony in constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, in light of the
Supreme Court’s existing judicial freedom in choosing rules of
interpretation, the imposition of traditional jurisprudential restraints on the Court is impossible, as a practical matter, since
the implementation of such a plan would require the consensual submission of the Court to such restraints (and thus, is a
result of, rather than a remedy for, judicial freedom).
C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of Traditional
Jurisprudence
1. Summary
With respect to practical implications for constitutional jurisprudence, Clinton’s theory need not include the final two
sections of God and Man in the Law. However, since most political theorists refuse to swallow the tautology that we should
adhere to tradition simply because “that is the way we have
always done it,” Clinton devotes the rest of his book to establishing an appropriate philosophical, epistemological, and
metaphysical foundation for his theory of judicial restraint
through the imposition of traditional rules of interpretation.
In the fairness of conceding my scholarly weaknesses, I78
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, “[T]he irresponsible judge will
twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires, and the stupid judge will do
the same thing unconsciously.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 286 (1985).
78. I apologize to the reader for this sudden shift in rhetorical style from third to
first person; however, as I personally found the remainder of Clinton’s book largely incomprehensible, this shift in style may be read as a signal to the more “philosophically
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must admit that I do not hold a Ph.D. in political philosophy.
And since this seems to be a prerequisite to complete comprehension of the final sections of God and Man in the Law, coverage of these sections is limited in this Review. Nevertheless, I
proceed—at least to a point.
Clinton seems to argue that one of the most fundamental
flaws in the philosophy of modern constitutional jurisprudence
is its adoption of the view shared by Kant, Hume, Locke, and
Berkeley that “ ‘ideas’ are the things which the mind thinks,
not the things by which it thinks.”79 Clinton views this “flaw” as
a basic, epistemological and metaphysical misconception. He
contends that viewing ideas in this manner implies “the notion
that we can be directly aware only of the contents of our individual minds” and thus “there can be no direct experience of
other individuals or of the contents of their minds.”80 This perception results in a denial of human nature, since “[t]here can
be no common reason and no rational basis for assuming even
the existence of a common humanity.”81 In addition, this view
leads to a skeptical conception of humanity as selfish, atomistic, and material, and denies the existence of anything that is
transcendent—i.e., nonmaterial.82 In this manner, theorists
such as John Austin “get rid of God . . . [by] simply defin[ing]
him away”83 and replace God with man as the giver of “positive
law.”
Rejection of the transcendent leads to either a denial of the
idea of natural law or results in a “truncated”84 version of natural law, based not on conventional morality which presupposes
a transcendent order in the cosmos but on more “empirical,”
materialistic conceptions of morality, such as the Social Darwinism of the Lochner era or the “Lifestyle Liberalism”85 which
currently prevails. By contrast, Clinton urges the version of
natural law developed by Thomas Aquinas, which divides law
sophisticated” reader that for the remainder of this Review, my remarks are only “objective” to the extent of my comprehension. Beyond that, they represent only the subjective reading experience of a reasonably intelligent, second-year law student.
79. See CLINTON, supra note 2, at 141.
80. Id. at 144.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 133-39.
83. Id. at 156.
84. Id. at 146.
85. Id. at 75. Clinton uses this term to represent the privacy rights protected by
the modern Court.
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into four fields: eternal law, natural law, divine law, and human law.86 Eternal law is God’s government of the universe,
which is inherent in things created.87 Natural law is the “imprint of eternal law on rational creatures directing natural inclination to its proper end.”88 The imprint of eternal law is imperfect and thus must be supplemented by divine law, which is
the “ordinance of grace due to sin.”89 Finally, human law is the
equivalent of modern positive law.90
Despite his affinity for Thomistic natural law, Clinton
claims not only that the Supreme Court never has employed
natural law, but that it cannot, and, even if it could, it should
not apply natural law in deciding the constitutional issues
which come before it.91 He specifically rejects the argument
that the current protection of “fundamental rights” is a result
of natural law analysis.92 Rather, Clinton claims that the fundamental rights analysis is based on a Millian-like “humanistic
religion” which denies the natural law’s emphasis on the truly
religious character of the law, the central role of the state in
guardianship of public morality, and the importance of social
status.93 This results in what Clinton labels “constitutional
gnosticism,” which distorts the purposes of the establishment,
speech and press, and equal protection clauses, removing God
from constitutional jurisprudence and putting man in His
place.
2. Critical response
Though Clinton excoriates the warping of due process,
equal protection, and establishment issues through modern
constitutional analysis, he fails to make clear how his favored,
Thomistic version of natural law would resolve the issues
which have arisen in the constitutional adjudication of these
clauses. More fundamentally, it is not even clear how Aquinas’s
four types of law interact to produce the theory of legal inter86. See id. at 152.
87. See id.
88. Id. (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
QUESTIONS 90-97) 14-16 (Stanley Parry ed., Regnery Gateway 1977).
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 163.
92. See id. at 166-70.
93. See id. at 167.
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pretation that Clinton seems to favor.
Assuming that Clinton does in fact espouse some form of
natural law jurisprudence, one of the perennial problems with
espousing a natural law approach to constitutional interpretation is that it creates a “loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard
for holding laws unconstitutional.”94 In other words,
[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject; and all the Court could properly say, in such an
event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal
right of opinion) has passed an act which, in the opinion of the
judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.95

Despite Clinton’s argument that “Naturalism, properly understood, . . . always counsels a healthy judicial restraint,”96 Clinton fails to explain how the “counsel” of restraint is to be converted into “actual” restraint.
To confuse matters further, Clinton seems to conclude that
natural law has not, and indeed should not, be applied by the
Supreme Court in the area of constitutional adjudication.97
This leaves readers in a quandary as to what theory of constitutional interpretation Clinton proposes. From his earlier discussions, he presumably leans toward a Thomistic natural law
foundation, but from his explicit rejection of the application of
natural law, the reader is left wondering what Clinton would
have the Court do.
In short, while Clinton’s ruminations regarding the natural
law-positive law controversy certainly produce a great deal of
gobbledygook, it is unclear in the final analysis what result
Clinton espouses. I will admit that the answer may lie somewhere between pages 131 and 170, but if it does, it is well hidden by the recondite rhetoric Clinton employs to develop it. The
only thing that can be said with clarity is that, in Clinton’s
view, God has been replaced by man in constitutional issues,
and, in the same manner in which the wings of the Australian
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
95. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.). Although Clinton
claims that the Court was not actually employing a natural law analysis in either Calder or (presumably) Griswold, he provides no basis for not subjecting his version of
natural law analysis to the same criticism.
96. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 149.
97. See supra Part II.C.1.
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butterfly cause the rainstorm in North America, this is somehow a result of the conception of ideas as objects of thought
rather than tools of thought. Go figure.
D. Constitutional Gnosticism and Constitutional Theism
The final portion of God and Man in the Law (like the previous portions) is prefaced by a short introduction in which
Clinton raises the reader’s hopes of comprehending the text by
stating, “[B]efore going any further, [it might be advantageous]
to catch a breath by way of summarizing some of the ideas that
have already been introduced.”98 I must admit that I was elated
at the prospect of a concise, comprehensible summary of the
erudite, metaphysical quagmire through which I had, somewhat unsuccessfully, trudged. My reprieve was short-lived,
however, as Clinton’s summary proved equally unintelligible. I
quote the beginning of Clinton’s summary at length, not only to
express my personal awe at how much can be said and so little
understood, but to allow the reader to whom this makes
sense—and you know who you are—to disregard my commentary and give this portion of the book his or her own fair shake:
[M]odern thought holds fast to a restrictive view of reason
that effectively eliminates the idea of the mind as an organ
providing direct access to an intelligible reality. This perspective has led to a conception of the mind as an organ whose
task is merely to process sense data by the application of logical or mathematical functions. Commensurate with the empiricist assumption that ideas are the very things we think
and not merely the vehicles of our thoughts, modern reason is
denied access to things in themselves (“things as such,” or
“things as they are”) through its denial of any necessary connection between thought and its objects. We are led to the position described by Bertrand Russell in The Principles of Pure
Mathematics:
When actual objects are counted, or when geometry or
dynamics are applied to actual space or actual matter, or
when, in any other way, mathematical reasoning is applied to what exists, the reasoning employed has a form
not dependent upon the objects that they are, but only
upon their having certain general properties. . . . Thus
when space or motion is spoken of in pure mathematics, it

98. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 171.
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is not actual space or actual motion, as we know them in
experience, that are spoken of, but any entity possessing
those abstract general properties of space or motion that
are employed in the reasonings of geometry or dynamics.
The question whether these properties belong, as a matter
of fact, to actual space or actual motion, is irrelevant to
pure mathematics, and therefore to the present work, being, in my opinion, a purely empirical question, to be investigated in the laboratory of the observatory. [citation
omitted].
The divorce of objects “just as they are” (and just as they are
experienced) from their “abstract general properties” leads
straightforwardly to an epistemological skepticism that denies the possibility of discovering objective truth in the cosmos and ultimately to a metaphysical nihilism that denies the
very existence of any external reality apart from that which is
accessible through sense perception.99

Well, there you have it. Multiply this by ten; repeat the
words “constitution” and “judicial supremacy” three times;
throw in a few phrases that include the expressions “noumenal,” “immanentize,” “metaxy,” and “antinomy”; mix well with
the first dozen five-syllable words ending in “-ism” that come to
mind; and “voilà,” the politico-philosophical, metaphysical,
epistemological, teleological, ontological, and theological foundations of Clinton’s theory emerge.
With that kind of introduction, I presume that the reader of
this Review will come to one of two conclusions: (1) she will
agree that Clinton’s editors should have returned his manuscript to him and demanded that he rewrite it in the English
language, or (2) she will dismiss my criticism as the unlearned
ejaculations of an ignorant student. And while the true answer
probably lies somewhere in between these two extremes, both
sides would likely agree that it is best at this point to proceed
quickly to the conclusions which relate to the practical implications of Clinton’s theory and leave the niceties of Clinton’s
metaphysics to those who have more time and patience, and
who have breakfasted on enough metaphysical Wheaties to
send in for the magical philosophical secret decoder ring.

99. Id. at 171-72.
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III. CONCLUSION

Whatever the metaphysical, epistemological, etc.-ical basis
for Clinton’s proposal to constrain judicial decisionmaking in
the constitutional arena by limiting judicial freedom, Clinton’s
approach fails for the more fundamental reason that, as a practical matter, it will not work. While reliance on common law
traditions may provide sufficient interpretive tools for constitutional provisions which clearly may be shown to have traditional common law antecedents, such an analysis may be inappropriate (or impossible) for constitutional provisions that
cannot clearly be shown to emanate from the common law. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that, even if implemented, the
traditional rules of interpretation (i.e., the plain-meaning, mischief, and golden rules, and the principle of stare decisis) would
act as an effective restraint against judicial supremacy. Finally, even if such traditional rules were to be consistently applied as a constraining force, the constraint would necessarily
be self-imposed. Thus, adopting Clinton’s traditional jurisprudence would not deprive the Court of judicial freedom, but
rather would be an affirmative act of judicial freedom, and
thus, paradoxically, would actually result in a perpetuation of
judicial supremacy.
As Clinton admits,100 God and Man in the Law is the “alternative” argument to his earlier theory for dethroning the judicial monarchy in Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review,
which in my view, presents a much more compelling solution to
the problem of judicial supremacy. In the spirit of alternative
pleading, God and Man in the Law effectively illustrates what
any competent lawyer knows: There is a good reason why alternative arguments find their way to the back of judicial
briefs.101
David D. Garner

100. See id. at 54-55.
101. For the concluding statement, the reviewer wishes to acknowledge Cory Talbot, whose quick wit was the genesis of the thought expressed.

